University of Tennessee, Knoxville

TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Masters Theses

Graduate School

5-2012

Fault Diagnosis Via Univariate Frequency Analysis Monitoring: A
Novel Technique Applied to a Simulated Integrated Drive
Generator
Brian Keith Bailey
bbaile10@utk.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes
Part of the Other Aerospace Engineering Commons, Other Chemical Engineering Commons, and the
Process Control and Systems Commons

Recommended Citation
Bailey, Brian Keith, "Fault Diagnosis Via Univariate Frequency Analysis Monitoring: A Novel Technique
Applied to a Simulated Integrated Drive Generator. " Master's Thesis, University of Tennessee, 2012.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/1129

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee Research and
Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of TRACE:
Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact trace@utk.edu.

To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Brian Keith Bailey entitled "Fault Diagnosis Via
Univariate Frequency Analysis Monitoring: A Novel Technique Applied to a Simulated Integrated
Drive Generator." I have examined the final electronic copy of this thesis for form and content
and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science, with a major in Chemical Engineering.
J. Wesley Hines, Major Professor
We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:
Charles F. Moore, David J. Keffer
Accepted for the Council:
Carolyn R. Hodges
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

Fault Diagnosis
Via
Univariate Frequency Analysis Monitoring
A Novel Technique Applied to a Simulated Integrated Drive Generator

A Thesis
Presented for the
Master of Science Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Brian Keith Bailey
May 2012

Copyright© 2010 by Brian Keith Bailey
All rights reserved

ii

DEDICATION
First and foremost, this thesis is dedicated to the strongest, kindest, and wisest person that I
know, Miss Annie B. Dreadin, my mother. From the earliest age that I can remember, she has
encouraged and inspired me to reach for my highest goals without fear of failure, even amongst the
criticism from the ever present cynics in our lives. I only hope that I continue to make her proud and
never lose her respect. I thank God for allowing me to be born unto this amazing woman.
Secondly, I would also like dedicate this thesis to the men and women of our armed forces. Let
their call to battle be infrequent. However, if they must draw a line and then defend it, then let them do
so with the very best technology that we can provide so they may come home to their families and a
grateful nation.
Finally, I present this thesis as evidence of observance of my Pledge as an Engineer to use my
skills, knowledge, and the principles of science for the benefit of all life, known and unknown.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
It has been a long road with many turns and bends, one stop, and two starts before reaching this
designation. There are many people that helped, encourage, and supported me in the reaching this mile
stone in my educational career. First, I want to thank my mother, to whom this thesis is dedicated. Her
love, support, and patience continue to make it possible for me to achieve my goals and dreams. My
successes are her successes and I am eternally grateful for her sacrifices.
I wish to express my thanks and gratitude to my advisor and advocate, Dr. J. Wesley Hines. Thank
you for the opportunity, the support, the advice, the guidance, and the patience that you have
demonstrated over the past two years. The opportunity to be instructed by you and to work with you
on this and previous work has opened this fascinating field of engineering science to me. More
importantly, I am extremely grateful and forever indebted to you for having confidence in me when I
had little in myself.
I want to express my gratitude and respect to Dr. Charlie Moore. First, allow me to thank you for
the opportunity and support that enable me to start and continue on this journey so many years ago.
My great respect for you inspired me to produce the best work possible. However, that drive for
perfection, resulted in failure to complete that original work and for this I am sorry.

Never-the-less,

upon my return to school, not only did show your support by agreeing to serve on my committee, but
you also welcome and encourage me without prejudice. From you, I have learned lessons that I will
carry through life and for this I am ever so grateful.
I would like to thank Dr. David Keffer for agreeing to serve on this committee as well. From my
first year as a graduate student, he has impressed and inspired me with the knowledgability and
enthusiasm that he continually conveyed as one of my instructors. I am grateful for your help and
service.
I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. Brian Edwards. It is with his help and advocacy that I have
been allowed this opportunity. I appreciate your help and support in petitioning the Graduate School
for an extension to complete the requirements for a degree of Master of Science in Chemical
Engineering.
I would also like to extend a special thank you to Dr. Jamie Coble. As a fellow research assistant,
her participation in this work has been invaluable. Her intellectual and facilitative assistance was
implemental in my re-acclimation to academia.
iv

I also wish to thank those entities that have provided financial support during my educational
pursuits. I am appreciative to Global Strategic Solutions for the financial support of this work. I would
like to thank Hamilton Sundstrand for providing the simulation data used in this work. I would also like
to acknowledge the current and continuing support of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission via the "US
NRC Graduate Fellowship Program to Promote Diversity in Nuclear Education at the University of
Tennessee" administer by Dr. Ivan Maldonado. I would be remiss in showing my appreciation if I did
acknowledge the support received from various entities from June 2002 to May 2005.
Finally, I wish to reaffirm my faith and belief in God. I acknowledge his ever-present influence
throughout my life that has guided me to this profession in which I take deep pride. By his will, I am an
Engineer, and to him I owe solemn obligations to provide responsible stewardship of his creation.

v

ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research was to develop a fault detection and diagnostic method that would
be able to detect and isolate seeded faults in data that was generated from a simulated integrated drive
generator. The approach to the solution for this problem is summarized below.
A novel approach for the detection and diagnoses of an anomaly due the occurrence of a fault
within a system has been developed. This innovative technique uses specific characteristics of the
frequency spectrum of a univariate signal to monitor system health for abnormal behavior due to
previously characterized component failure.
A fault detection and diagnostic scheme was developed that used dual heteroassociative kernel
regression models. The first of these empirical models estimates selected features from the analytical
redundant spectrum characteristic profile of the exciter current using power demand, a stressor, placed
on the system as input query.

The predicted spectrum features were compared to the actual

characteristic features, which resulted in the generation of a residual signal. This signal was then
analyzed in order to determine if they were the result of normal system disturbances or a predefined
fault. If a fault was detected, the residual signal was passed to the second model, which isolated, and
given enough information, identified the specific component of components causing the anomaly.
Two case studies are presented to illustrate the capability to detect, isolate, and identify a system
anomaly. As demonstrated, the monitoring of the frequency spectrum of a single variable can provide
adequate indication of equipment health. With the availability of the appropriate data, as in the first
case, it is possible for the development of three-layer detection and diagnostic systems that provides
fault detection, isolation, and identification. A three-layer detection and diagnostic system is essential
in the development of more advance health monitoring and prognostic systems. Despite some
shortcomings in the simulated data made available for this work, this method is believed to be
applicable to data that more realistically captures real-world relationships, including sensor noise and
faults that grow with time.
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INTRODUCTION
Technology continues to grow exponentially, allowing for new advances in every aspect of human

activity. With these advances, the complexification of equipment and processes, herein referred to as
systems, has given rise to issues of cost efficiency, availability, reliability, and safety. These issues are
obviously important in the operations of nuclear, chemical, and other industrial facilities where major
failures or catastrophes often results in substantial damage and lost. Similar importance has been
gained in the operation of high-performance ships, submarines, airplanes, space vehicles, transit
systems, communication networks, and other structures where safety, mission criticality, and material
value are at stake. There is no question that a failure in such advance systems, especially safety-critical
systems, can lead to extremely serious consequences in terms of human mortality, environmental
impact, and economic loss. Therefore, ever more vigilant maintenance activities are required in order to
assure the reliability and continued operation of these crucial systems.
The maintenance activities around these advance systems have historically been preventive in
nature, usually utilizing a scheduled-based maintenance (SBM) philosophy. The implementation of this
philosophy, however, comes at the expense of availability and cost efficiency. As the costs of these
practices continue to increase and the availability of these systems become critical, many organizations
are turning to condition-based maintenance (CBM) philosophies has an effective alternative. These
philosophies advocate the use of both real-time and historical data to determine the necessity of action
allowing for the prioritization of maintenance resources and the optimization of system uptime.
As an example, nuclear power utilities have been exploring monitoring technologies for the
purposes of determining equipment condition, specifically sensor operation. Under original licensing
requirements, nuclear power plants are required to recalibrate all safety critical instruments at each
refueling outage. This calibration requirement gives rise to a couple of concerns that are typical of the
SBM philosophy. The first of these concerns is that faulty equipment (sensors in this case) goes
undetected between scheduled maintenance raising issues of reliability. The second concern deals with
the ineluctable fact that every sensor is not in need of maintenance, and therefore unnecessary costs
are incurred by the operator. However, monitoring real-time or near real-time data allows for the
detection of faulty equipment. Not only does this potentially improve plant safety and reliability with
early detection of faulty equipment before the scheduled outages, it also has brings about direct and
1

indirect cost savings by reducing the amount of unneeded maintenance and the overall length of an
outage [1].
With advantages of improved system operation and safety while reducing overall operation cost,
the concept of CBM is gaining wider acceptance spurring increase research in its implementation. The
increased interest in CBM research has also led to the development of intelligent condition-based
maintenance systems (CBMplus).

The CBMplus concept approaches turnkey maintenance beginning

with the detection and diagnoses of system fault, the determination of system reliability, the requisition
of required components, and the scheduling of craft personnel.

The detection and diagnostic

functionality of such systems is usually, at least conceptually, accomplished by an integrated diagnostics
system. With the addition of prognostic functionality, predictions of a system's future health become
feasible. This combination of detection, diagnostic, and prognostic functionalities form the basis of what
is often referred to as a Prognostic and Health Management (PHM) system. A refined PHM system is the
cornerstone of a fully developed CBMplus system.
The importance of PHM development and its role in CBMplus systems can be inferred by the
following illustration. The Department of Defense has made PHM and CBMplus implementation a
required consideration for any new system via its 5000.2 policy on defense acquisition [2]. The policy
states that "program managers shall optimize operational readiness through affordable, integrated,
embedded, diagnostics and prognostics, and embedded training and testing, serialized item
management, automatic identification technology (AIT), and iterative technology refreshment" [3]. The
development of the United States military's Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is an exemplification of this
particular policy.
As PHM systems are the cornerstone of CBMplus systems, fault detection and diagnostics are
critical in the development of effective PHM systems. With this in mind, the work presented here does
not focus on prognostics, but rather the detection and diagnosis of system faults. Readers interested in
current prognostic research and development are referred to Mishra et al [4] for life consumption
monitoring, Liao et al [5] for proportional hazards modeling, Lu and Meeker [6] for general degradation
path modeling, and Coble [7] for prognostic parameter identification. The component of a PHM system
in which this paper gives attention includes: the detection of a system fault, the subsequent isolation of
that fault, and to some degree, the identification of said fault.

2

Objectives

1.1

As previously discussed, substantial improvements in maintenance, safety, cost, and overall
availability can be made with the incorporation of monitoring, detection, diagnostic and prognostic
technologies into health management systems of equipment, processes, and vehicles. As shown in
Figure 1, a PHM system is commonly built on several modules which use captured system data to
monitor for changes, determine if those changes are due to a fault, diagnose the fault, and then predict
the remaining useful life (RUL), time of failure (ToF), or probability of failure (PoF).
As mentioned, this work focuses on the fault detection and diagnosis components of the
conceptual PHM system illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 2 summarizes the basic construction of a fault
detection and diagnosis system. The first task, which forms the base of the Figure 2 pyramid, is the
differentiation of perturbations from disturbances and faults. Once a fault has been detected, it is then
isolated by determining the kind, the location, and the time of detection. The capstone of the fault
system pyramid is fault identification; whereas, the size and time of onset is determined. However, the
importance of this task varies depending on the researcher and his/her interests.

Many researchers

consider the first two tasks the most important; therefore, defining fault diagnosis as fault detection and
isolation (FDI) [8]. Even so, others like Simani et al [9] argues that fault identification is the most
important of all fault diagnosis tasks and call for more research to be done in this area. Nevertheless,
both considerations are given attention in this paper with the application of the fault diagnosis method
presented herein.
The following paper introduces a novel approach for monitoring the frequency spectrum of a
single variable for the purposes of symptomatic residual generation, fault detection, and fault
diagnostics (i.e., isolation and identification).

As a demonstration, this approached is applied to OEM

provided, simulated integrated drive generator (IDG) data to illustrate its capability to:




Extract pre-specified features from a spectral analysis of a single measured variable and
via a comparison of the expected and actual features, generate symptomatic residuals.
Subject these symptomatic residuals to a probabilistic reasoning method to differentiate
between system disturbances and actual faults.
Finally, isolate and identify the specific defect if the hypothesis that the residuals are
indeed a symptom of a system fault is true.

3

Figure 1: Conceptual Prognostic and Health Management System

Figure 2: Conceptual Fault Diagnosis System

4

1.2

Document Structure
Hereafter, the following report is organized into six sections. Section 2 presents a two prong

literature review. The first subsection discusses the general components of fault detection and
diagnostic system and the various methods of implementing the functionality of those components. The
second subsection briefly surveys how fault detection and diagnostics has been applied to different
systems of a modern aircraft.
Section 3 presents an in-depth review of the modeling method used as the foundation of the
technique described in this report. Kernel regression, the non-parametric modeling approach, is first
explained. Following this, the initialization of a model, including architecture types and variable
selection, is discussed.

With a working model initialized, the next topic considered is that of

optimization via the selection of the kernel bandwidth, the method of vector section, and the
appropriate number of memory vectors. Finally, several commonly used performance metrics are
presented for completeness.
Section 4 describes the simulation data that has been used to demonstrate the proposed concept
presented in this report. This section also includes a description of the aircraft component, the
integrated drive generator, that the data has been simulated.
Section 5 introduces the new concept of building a fault detection and diagnosis system when only
a single signal is available. Unlike the approach of the more common traditional empirical models that
normally utilities correlated input and output variables, the method presented in this section uses the
frequency domain of a single variable alone with selected stress conditions to monitored system health.
The development of the models used in the detection and diagnosis is discussed here. Some model
development considerations that are more specific to the data has been included here instead of the
more general items discussed in Section 3. Models were developed for fault detection and diagnosis
systems for each of the two simulated data sets discussed in Section 4. Although several performance
metrics are discussed in Section 3, the majority of these metrics were not applicable due to the specific
architecture used. The only exception was the accuracy metric. As a result, the performance for not
only the models but that of the detection and diagnosis systems are presented graphically.
Section 6 summarizes the work presented in the previous section and presents the drawn
conclusions. The final section, Section 7, takes an opportunity to presents some areas of research that
should be consider as this method is expanded in future work.
5

2

LITERATURE SURVEY
Obviously an exhaustive survey of the literature on fault diagnosis systems and their applications

is beyond the scope of this work. Nevertheless, a review of current literature concerning the two
immediate subjects of interest is presented in the following two subsections. First, the subject of what
defines a fault diagnostic system, as reference by the literature, is explored by discussing the general
implementation of fault detection, isolation, and to some degree, identification. Then a perspectival
survey of various applications of fault detection and diagnosis systems to aircraft systems is provided.

2.1

Literature of Fault Diagnosis Systems
A fault diagnosis system can be defined as a system that is used to “detect faults and diagnose

their location and significance” [10]. A fault diagnosis system consists of the tasks illustrated in Figure 2:




Fault Detection: Make a determination that either everything is operating within
the specified normal range or that something has gone wrong.
Fault Isolation: Determine the kind and location of the fault, e.g., which component
has degraded.
Fault Identification: Estimate the size, nature, and onset of the fault.

As discussed, the importance of either one of these tasks relative to the other is subjective. The
consensus seems to be that fault detection and isolation are almost equally important for any practical
diagnostic system. Fault identification, on the other hand, may not be consider as important unless
some prognostic determination is required or some reconfiguration action is involved. However, the
argument of which tasks are most important is beyond the scope of this paper as are the specific details
of implementing either one of them.
2.1.1

Common Terminology Used in Fault Diagnosis
Before continuing with the discussion of fault diagnosis implementation, a review of some

commonly used terminology is prudent. Recognizing the difficulty of understanding contributors' goals
and hindering the comparison of various approaches due to the inconsistent use of diagnostic
terminology, the International Federation of Automatic Control (IFAC) technical committee
SAFEPROCESS (Fault Detection, Supervision, and Safety for Technical Process) started an initiative to
standardize the definitions for terms used in fault diagnosis. SAFEPROCESS was first created in 1991 as
a steering committee within the IFAC due to increasing interest in the field of fault detection and
6

diagnosis, and then became a technical committee in 1993. As a result of the committee's efforts, these
terms and their respective definitions are prevalent in the current literature. As such, the following list
of terms in Table 1, adopted for use in this paper, is largely consistent with SAFEPROCESS terminology as
present in Isermann and Ballé [11].
2.1.2

Fault Detection
According to Isermann [12], the methods for fault detection can be classified on the basis of the

following four quantities:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Measurable Signals
Nonmeasurable State Variables
Nonmeasurable Process Parameters
Nonmeasurable Characteristic Quantities

Over the last several decades, there has been substantial amount of work in the area of process
supervision and fault detection for class one; whereas, only a limited amount as been done for the
remaining categories. With that in mind, the following section presents brief discussions of those
detection methods used for measurable signals.
2.1.2.1 Single Signal Limit and Trend Checking
The simplest and most frequently used detection methods are often found in those operations
that utilized statistical process control and are referred to as limit and trend checking or geometrical
analysis [9]. Such methods are restricted to directly checking a single measureable variable for changes
in magnitude or trends, and then alarming when a threshold is reached.
Limit checking is applied to an absolute value in which maximum and minimum threshold limits
are established for a single measurement signal

. Here, the normal state is defined as:
(2.1)

Trend checking is similar in form to that of limit checking with the exception being that the method is
applied to the trend of a measured signal

such that:
(2.2)

Monitoring a measured signal for faults by tracking its change may be advantageous because detection
of an anomaly can occur earlier than that of absolute value checking. This advantage is due to the fact
that trends permit a certain level of prediction for the measurement's progression. Nonetheless, both
limit and trend checking, whilst simple to implement, has serious drawbacks including [10, 12, 13] :
7

Table 1: Common Fault Diagnosis Terminology
TERM
Disturbance
Fault
Error

DEFINITION
An unknown (and uncontrolled) input acting on a system
A unpermitted deviation of at least one characteristic property or parameter of the system from
the acceptable, usual, or standard condition, i.e., a malfunction of a system component
A deviation between a measured or computed value and the true, specified or theoretically
correct value

Residual

A fault indicator which is based on a deviation between the measured and model-based values

Symptom

A change in an observable quantity from that which is considered normal behavior, i.e., an
observable effect of a fault

Fault
Detection
Fault
Isolation
Fault
Identification
Fault
Diagnosis
Monitoring
Isolable Fault
Quantitative
Model
Qualitative
Model
Diagnostic
Model

Indication of the faults present in a system
Determination of the kind, location, and time of detection of a fault—follows fault detection
Determination of the size and time of onset of a fault—follows fault isolation
The indication of a fault and the determination of the kind, location, and time of detection—
follows fault detection and includes fault isolation (fault identification, depending on the
researcher, may also be included in this definition)
A continuous real-time task of determining the conditions of a physical system, by recording
information, recognizing and indication anomalies in the behavior
A fault that is distinguishable from other faults using one residual set
Use of static and dynamic relations among system variables and parameters in order to describe
a system's behavior in quantitative mathematical terms
Use of static and dynamic relations among system variables and parameters in order to describe
a system's behavior in qualitative terms such as causalities or if-then rules
A set of static or dynamic relations which link specific input variables to specific output
variables, i.e., symptoms to their respective faults the faults

8







Necessity to have an a priori knowledge of the characteristics of the measurement
signals
Dependency of measurement characteristics on the operating states of the system
which, are not known a priori and are subject to change beforehand
False alarms due to a measurement's sensitive to noise, random input variations,
and changes in operating points
False alarms in other system measurements' due to spillover effects from another
single measurement
Detection of faults usually after the output values have been considerably affected

However, it should be pointed out that prediction modeling of deterministic or stochastic
measurements

beyond that of trend analysis can also be employed. This not only reduces or even

avoids the fore mention drawbacks, it also allows for the estimation of the time that the threshold may
be exceeded. This particular capability provides an operator the opportunity to determine courses of
action that could prevent more costly consequences. This philosophy of determining the future state of
a system for the purpose of early intervention has led to the introduction of model-based fault
detection.
However, it should be pointed out that prediction modeling of deterministic or stochastic
measurements

beyond that of trend analysis can also be employed. This not only reduces or even

avoids the fore mention drawbacks, it also allows for the estimation of the time that the threshold may
be exceeded. This particular capability provides an operator the opportunity to determine courses of
action that could prevent more costly consequences. This philosophy of determining the future state of
a system for the purpose of early intervention has led to the introduction of model-based fault
detection.
2.1.2.2 Multiple Signals and Consistency Checking
The use of consistency checking of a system's measured values is an established approach of
system monitoring that greatly enhances the process of not only fault detection but fault diagnosis as
well. The development of such fault detection systems is primarily based on two methods of generating
fault indicating symptoms: physical redundancies or functional redundancies.
Hardware (physical) redundancy, consider the traditional approach to fault diagnosis design, uses
three or more components for the same function. A deviation in the consistency check of signals from

9

redundant devices initializes a voting logic and switching mechanism to isolate and identify the fault.
This type of redundancy is widely used in safety critical systems throughout industry.
Hardware redundancy is effective and very reliable (if identical equipment is used); however, such
systems do present some drawbacks. For example, subtle degradations in system behaviors are difficult
to detect with hardware redundancies.

More significantly, the design of such systems require extra

equipment, a larger foot print to accommodate the equipment, and additional maintenance costs which
are counterintuitive to modern fault detection-diagnosis research and CBM philosophies [11, 14].
As a result of the decreasing cost of digital hardware and software alone with ever increasing
computational power, considerable attention has been and continues to be given to the area of using
functional relationships between variables to ‟cross check” each other. Such schemes may roughly
divide into two categories, knowledge-base approaches, associated with qualitative, heuristic reasoning
models and analytical redundancy approaches that exploits quantifiable, analytical rich information for
the development of mathematical and data driven models.
Knowledge-based approaches make use of limited-knowledge to derive heuristic descriptions of a
system in the form of qualitative models or rule-based representations. With heuristic models, accuracy
is not necessarily governed by the precision in the description or the complexity of the model. In fact, a
knowledge-based model developed with a high level of abstraction with less complexity can still produce
accurate results. Another advantage with the knowledge-based approach concerns that of
measurement precision. The preciseness of measurements is of critical importance for model
performance if they are precise in their description. However, increase measurement imprecision can be
tolerated by those models developed with a high level of abstraction. Nevertheless, this advantage does
have the drawback of being less sensitive in the presence of smaller faults.
Unlike those systems where a knowledge-based approach is appropriate, systems that have
substantial amounts of sensor information are well suited for an analytical redundancy approach.
Information rich systems can be described by either mathematical or empirical models. The resulting
models form the foundation of fault detection and diagnosis schemes based on analytical redundancy.
These model-based schemes take advantage of using dissimilar measured values to cross-compare each
other, rather than replicating each piece of hardware. The comparison between a measured signal and
its estimation, which is generated by a mathematical model of the monitored system or component, is
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often referred to as consistency checking. The resulting difference is a residual signal

, and is

generated in such a way to satisfy the following condition:
(2.3)
The residual signal of a non-faulted system should be zero valued when the fault signal

is zero. This

is the basis for fault detection [15]. However, due to the presence of noise, modeling error, and other
disturbances, the resulting residuals are generally not zero for actual fault free systems. As a result, a
fault detection schemes must include the capability to evaluate the generated residual signal in order to
differentiate those non-zero values that are due to disturbances and actual faults. Therefore, modelbased fault detection can be thought of as a two-stage process: residual generation and decisionmaking (including residual evaluation) [10, 16, 17]. Figures 3a and 3b illustrate the basic concept of a
two stage fault detection scheme via analytical redundancy.
2.1.2.3 General Structure of Residual Generation
Because residual generation is central to model-based fault diagnosis systems, a variety of
methods have been purposed throughout the literature. The key to residual generation for the
purposes of fault detection is the creation of residuals that are sensitive to faults and insensitive to
disturbances that may produce false alarms. Referring back to the residual generation blocks of Figure
3A and 3B, the redundant signal
measurement signal

is the result of the function

a set of residuals

, and alone with the actual output

is computed by the difference function

.

The residual generator block depicted in Figure 3A is referred to as an output estimator. Here, F1 is
a function of both input and output that results in an estimation of a linear function of the output

.

In the case of an open-loop system, F1 is an input-output description for an actual measurement. F1 of
Figure 3B is referred to as a system simulator in which the actual signal

is not required unlike that

of an output estimator. However, the type, be it simulator or estimator, of method used, a residual
generator is a linear processor whose input consist of both input and output of the system being
monitored.
Figure 4 shows the general structure of a residual generator as depicted by Patton and Chen [10].
The structure is expressed mathematically as:
(2.4)
The transfer matrices,

and

are achievable using linear systems, and according to the

definition via equation 2.3, the residual is designed to be zero for fault-free systems and nonzero in the
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presence of faults.

In order to satisfy this condition, these matrices must satisfy the following

constraint:
(2.5)
Equation 2.4 is a generalized representation of all residual generators [10]. The design of the residual
generator is simply based upon the selection of the transfer matrices,
Equation 2.5. Therefore, different parameterizations of

and

and

,

which satisfy

results in the various methods

of residual generation.
As alluded to previously, the generation of residuals is cardinal in analytical based fault diagnosis,
and has resulted in a variety of methods found throughout literature. The majority of those methods fall
within three classification:




Parameter estimation [11, 12, 15]
Parity vector (relation) methods [16]
Observer based approaches [18-20]

However, the discussion of implementation of these various methods and their appearances in
literature is beyond the scope of this paper, and is left for the interested reader to survey.

Figure 3A: Model-Base Fault Detection via Output Estimator
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Figure 3B: Model-Base Fault Detection via System Simulator

Figure 4: The General Structure of a Residual Generator
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2.1.2.4 Decision Making via Change Detection
With the generalization of a residual generator defined, the realizable creation of quantifiable
symptoms is possible as demonstrated from the variety of literature references. Now, the question of
the second task of fault detection comes to bear. How are the residual signals evaluated in order to
detected subtle changes in system parameters that are indicative of faults? As discussed with limit and
trend checking, a decision process could be as simple as a threshold test on the instantaneous values of
the moving averages of the parameters, especially in the case of deterministic systems. However, the
posed question becomes particularly significant in the presence of noise, disturbances, and other
unknown influences. The following discussion focuses on the detection of faults from the resulting
symptomatic changes within residual signals of a stochastic system utilizing statistical methods.
Mean and Variance Limit Checking
Simani et al [9] describes one class of detection methods as an extension of the limit checking of
instantaneous values. Instead of monitoring the moving averages as in deterministic systems, the
changes in the residuals, as referenced to the normal behavioral mean and variance values, are
monitored.
Consider a set of residual measurement signals

— where is the

dimension of

a q-dimensional space. The mean and variance are given by the following equations respectively:
(2.6)
The analytic symptomatic changes are obtained via the following:
(2.7)
Most often, the time instant t represents the unknown time of the fault occurrence, i.e.

. A

detection limit is utilized for the separation of normal operation from operational behavior that is the
result of some fault. This limit is usually a fixed threshold

which, is defined as:
(2.8)

Note that the choice of epsilon is a compromise between the detection of the small faults and false
alarms.
Hypothesis Testing via SPRT
Another class of decision methods exploits standard hypothesis testing routines that employ
likelihood ratios.

Garvey [21] describes two methods that have been historically used for fault
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detection, cumulative sum (CUSUM) and the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT).

For the purpose

of change detection, the general implementation of SPRT is discussed in detail.
The sequential probability ratio test is a statistical technique developed by Wald for deciding
between two hypotheses

and

[22]. For the purposes of this discussion the hypotheses under

consideration are:


Let

: The system is most likely to be in a fault-free state
: The system is most likely to be in a faulted state

denoted

successive observations of the residual signal . Assume that

probability of observing
alternative

given

is true

Then Wald's sequential test of

is the
against the

consists of the following general procedure (in logarithmic form) [23].

1. Calculate the logarithmic likelihood ratio.
(2.9)
2. Compare the ratio to a lower (A) and upper (B) bound that are defined by the
following equations, respectively.
(2.8)

When

(2.10)

Alpha
and beta
determines the strength of the test, where

is the false alarm probability, i.e., the probability of rejecting when
is true

is the missed alarm probability, i.e., the probability of accepting
when
is true
is less than A, then the null hypothesis is accepted. On the other hand, if
is greater

than B, then the null hypothesis is rejected, and a fault is indicated. However, when

greater

than A but less than B, then the state is indeterminate.
2.1.3

Fault Isolation
With the successful detection of a fault comes the task of isolating its occurrence. From the

definition in Table 1, fault isolation is the determination of the type, the location, and the time of
detection. This next section presents two fault isolation procedures, described by Patton and Chen [10,
15], that begin by the passing of the symptomatic signal to residual-based module designed to
distinguish specific faults.
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2.1.3.1 Structured Residual Set
The first approach is based on the use of structured sets of residuals. Each residual is designed to
be sensitive to a particular fault or subset of faults while remaining insensitive to the remaining faults.
There are two schemes employed in designing a structured residual set, dedicated and generalized. The
structural scheme is defined by the sensitivity and insensitivity relationship between the residuals and
faults.

Figures 5 and 6 [10] illustrates dedicated and generalized structured residual diagrams,

respectively, for the isolation of three different faults.
The dedicated scheme is the simplest isolable residual structure that allows all faults to be
detected simultaneously. However this structure is difficult to implement in practice, and there is
normally no design freedom to achieve other desirable performances such as robustness against
modeling errors. Whereas the more commonly used scheme is the generalized structured residual set
that makes each residual sensitive to all faults but one. In order to make the appropriate fault decision,
simple threshold logic may be utilized in either of the two methods.

Figure 5: Dedicated Structure Residual Set

Figure 6: Generalized Structure Residual Set
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2.1.3.2 Fixed Direction Residual Vector
An alternative method of achieving the isolability of faults is through the design of directional
residual vectors. As seen in Figure 7, the directional vector , corresponding to a particular fault, lies in a
fixed fault specific subspace of the residual space. The basis for the isolation of a fault is the fault
signature subspace . The fault signature subspace is determined by defining the effects associated with
each unique fault. A fault is isolated by determining which fault signature creates the smallest angle
with the fault specified subspace. In Figure 7, for example, the directional vector
with fault signature subspace
2.1.4

corresponds best

because they obviously create the smallest angle.

Fault Identification
Recall that the importance of fault identification is subjective in the field of fault diagnosis. As the

preceding discussions have explained, fault detection and isolation can be achieved relatively easily.
However, there has not been much research in the area of fault identification conducted; therefore,
literature information is extremely limited.
The previous section presented an introductory discussion for the development of fault detection
and diagnosis for measured signals. Traditional fault detection methods via single output signals include
limit and trend checking and single measurement analysis. However, most of the attention has been
focused on fault diagnosis of multiple signals using residuals, resulting from system redundancy, for
detection and isolation functions.

Figure 7: Directional Residual Vector for Fault Isolation
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2.2

Fault Detection and Diagnosis in Aerospace Literature
The introduction touched on the how the PHM system for the planned JSF is the key component

of the CBMplus support system for this weapon platform. The expected benefit of an integrated PHM
system on this aircraft and it ability to initiate the autonomic functions as compared to legacy aircraft
includes:





Higher reliability of the aircraft, improving overall readiness
Near real time assessment of aircraft
Monitoring of life usage data for components parts
Reduction in the cost of aircraft maintainability

The JSF program is a unique opportunity for taking advantage of available PHM and CBM technologies.
Designers and researchers are mindful that this program involves more than the development of a
multi-branch aircraft. It is the development of a new concept that centers on the platform of an
intelligent aircraft that encompasses a comprehensive PHM capability that enhances flight safety and
deployment readiness by engaging its own automated logistics, which Hess and Fila [24] of the Naval Air
Systems Command (NAVAIR) referred to as an Autonomic Logistics (AL) system. The AL system is a
CBMplus supportability concept that will enable the health management system (HMS) of the JSF to
initialize its own maintenance procedures; therefore, allowing for better utilization and more efficient
operation of the aircraft while maintained at lower cost. Since the JSF is currently under development,
designers have a unique opportunity to take full advantage of the on-going research and resulting
technologies to not only build an intelligent aircraft but to do so with aging aircraft in mind. Even
though the engineers of the JSF have the benefit of incorporating a PHM system early on, one of the
major goals is to design a system that can be adapted to legacy aircraft. Therefore, the addition of
instrumentation or sensors for the purpose of performance evaluation beyond that is currently available
is to be avoided.
Various health monitoring, detection, and diagnosis technologies have been developed for
aerospace applications. The following section describes some to the ongoing health management
research that is currently being conducted in the area of aircraft and aerospace systems.
2.2.1

Propulsion, Structural, and Avionic Health Management
There is and will continue to be substantial research in the health management of aerospace

systems. Tolani et al [25] introduces a new algorithm to identify slow time scale anomalies for aircraft
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gas turbine engines using symbolic dynamics and information theory. Furthermore, they compare this
new tool with traditional pattern recognition tools of principal component analysis and artificial neural
network. Brotherton et al [26] discusses several of the approaches to the development of monitoring ,
diagnosis, and prognosis of component failures in turbine engines. The authors present techniques
that couple neural nets and automated rule extractors. The resulting integrated approach is then
compared to traditional PHM systems.
Munns and Kent [27] talks about the three principal structural degradation modes of commercial
and large military aircraft: accidental damage, environmental damage, and fatigue. They present their
discussions with specific examples of these degradation mechanisms and their possible causes. A brief
explanation of how air carriers are currently developing and implementing structural maintenance
programs is included. Finally, the authors present sensor and data management strategies that might
be incorporated in a health management system. However, these strategies involve the development of
and implementation new sensor technologies on new aircraft that offers little benefit to legacy aircraft.
Vichare and Pecht [2] presents the state-of-practice and the current state-of-research in
electronics health management. Their review presents discussion of four current approaches including
built-in-test (BIT), use of fuses and canary devices, monitoring and reasoning of failure precursors, and
modeling accumulated damage based on measured life-cycle loads.

The authors provide good

descriptions of each approach alone with their drawbacks. For example, they noted that despite the
apparent sophistication of BIT, the approach tends to have either a significant number of false alarms, or
missed alarms.
Orsagh et al [28, 29] reports on their work in developing prognostics for avionic systems. They
selected two avionics applications, a switch-mode power and a global positioning system (GPS) receiver,
to demonstrate the validity of applying prognostics techniques to electrical systems that had been
developed for mechanical systems. Both applications were accelerated to failure by exposing them to
specific environmental conditions. The GPS was placed into an environmental chamber exposing it to
thermal cycling while a principle feature value (PFV) was monitored. From a series of thermal cycling of
two different units, the authors were able to develop an equation that predicted the PFV at a given
number of cycles. The power supply devices were accelerated to failure by exposing them to extreme
electrical and thermal stresses. With this device, the authors reported that diode failure was the
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resulting failure mechanism, which is indicated by a notable feature in the shape of the power loss curve
resembling that of electro-migration.
2.2.2

Electrical Generator Health Management
As previously discussed, aircraft require a substantial amount of electrical power for take-off

flight, and landing operations. This power is provided both externally and internally with the integrated
drive generators (IDG) being the main on-board power source.

The fast and accurate detection and

isolation of faults are necessary for the safe and reliable operation of the IDG and the aircraft. Several
approaches for fault detection and diagnosis of synchronous generators are described in literature.
Megahed and Malik [30] use an artificial neural network (ANN) to emulate the dynamic behavior
of the synchronous generator. The scheme that they present consist of two feed forward neural
networks (FNN). Its function is to differentiate between three generator states: normal, external fault,
and internal fault. The neural network is trained using various data sets. The first ANN model consists
of seven currents with each current having five samples totaling 35 inputs, which are mapped to the
three generator states. It is a three-layer FNN with 18 and 10 tan-sigmoid neurons in the first and
second hidden layers respectively, and the output layer contains 3 log-sigmoid neurons. A trip-logic
module is utilized to alarm when it confirms that the output of the fault detector is either an internal
fault or a prolonged external fault. If an internal fault is indicated, then the second ANN model is
activated. This logic module is also composed of two parts. The first part is a three-layer ANN that
classifies the phases as either faulty or healthy. The first and second layers consisting of fourteen and
seven tan-sigmoid neurons respectively and the output layer has three log-sigmoid neurons.

The

second part of the module is a fault classifier that averages the FNN output.
However, Tantawy et al [31] points out that the use of neural networks requires large,
comprehensive data sets to capture different modes of operation, and unless sufficient data is available
to cover the range of faults and conditions, then the classifier will be inadequate.

Therefore, they

present a physical based fault detection approach that focuses on the electrical subsystems.

This type

of model usually calculates the excitation current mathematically and compares it to the measured
exciting current. Tantawy et al expands on the approach by creating a hybrid model that captures the
machine transients. Their model successfully simulated both normal and fault conditions and showed
that faults were apparent in some signals, like damper winding currents.
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A fault in the generator, inter-turn or ground, produces additional flux harmonics in the air gap
which can be related to the cause of the fault. The flux is not pure sinusoidal even during normal
operation due to the magneto-motive force (mmf) distribution. However under faulty conditions, the
flux harmonics in the air gap are detectable due to the increase magnitude in different windings [31].
Several techniques have been proposed that uses these harmonics. Harmonics caused by a fault
condition in the field and armature windings are used to classify field and armature inter-turn faults,
short-circuited diodes, phase to ground faults, and external faults [32]. Field and armature shorts can be
diagnose by using the harmonic generated in the rotor winding [33]. However, the detection of faults
due to changes in the harmonic flux of the air gap requires additional sensors, which would be expensive
if implemented in legacy aircraft.
As discussed, much work as been performed in the areas of monitoring aerospace system for
faults and identifying their cause. Several approaches have been proposed for accomplishing these
tasks including neural networks, physics-based models, and protective components like fuses or canary
devices. This paper, however, introduces a novel approach for an aircraft generator using an empirical
(data-based) model, specifically memory-based kernel regression, and extracted features from the
frequency domain of a single measured signal.
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3

EMPIRICAL MODELING APPROACH
Modeling is a fundamental tool used by scientist and engineers from virtually every field to

describe relations between observable events or situations. The first models developed, like Newton's
Laws, were based on general observations made from the interactions of the environment and are
referred to as first-principles models. It is these mathematical models and the physical equations
resulting from them that modern science and engineering is based. However, first-principle models are
rarely able to incorporate all of the effects an environment may have on a system. Even if highly
accurate first-principles models are developed for a system, the models will become obsolete as the
system degrades or changes from its original design basis.
However, first-principles models are not the only category of modeling available to modern
science and engineering, especially with the aid of computers. Empirical models developed from
historical data consisting of parameter measurements collected over the operating range of a system
seek to learn the relationships between these recorded measurements to foster better process
understanding. With improved understanding of the relationship between operating parameters, the
monitoring of a system for the detection and diagnoses of an abnormal event becomes possible. In
short, a data-based empirical model's ability to "learn" parametric relationships allows for the
development of supervised systems, defined by Isermann [12] as a system that is able to detect,
evaluate, and diagnose, the occurrence of faults.
The previous section examined a method that utilizes predictive models to estimate operational
parameters, system states, or measured signals. These predictions are compared to nominal values to
generate residuals, which are used for system health evaluation. If a fault is detected, the symptomatic
residuals are processed to identify patterns that are indicative of prior anomalies. This work seeks to
extend the use of data-based models as nominal signal estimators for the purpose of cross checking
actual corresponding signals. This cross checking function serves as a way to generate symptomatic
residuals that are very similar to traditional residual-based fault detection and diagnosis routines.
The next sections discuss the development of a non-parametric modeling approach using kernel
regression, which has been successfully deployed in on-line monitoring applications. First, a general
overview of kernel regression is introduced. Following this discussion, various model architectures
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utilizing this approach are presented. Thirdly, model performance metrics relative to system or process
health monitoring are identified. Finally, a brief discussion of model optimization is presented.

3.1

Kernel Regression
Kernel Regression (KR) is a non-parametric regression technique that estimates an expected value

of a real random variable with respect to a conditional probability distribution. This particular definition
seems to be broad and non-specific. Therefore, for the purpose of the work described herein, kernel
regression is specifically defined as an empirical modeling technique that utilizes a probability density
function alone with historical memory observations to estimated response variables based on a
weighted average. This section provides an overview of the KR algorithm as detailed by Garvey [21]
beginning with a top-level description of the methodology. Following this, his method of quantifying
similarity via distance measures and kernel functions are discussed.
Atkeson et al [34] defines kernel regression as a statistical approach of fitting constants using
locally weighted averages of historical, exemplar observations. Garvey [21] details kernel regression via
the following example. Consider the case where n observations of an input, X, and an output, Y, has
been collected. In order to estimate the output for a given observation of input, the following equation,
referred to as the Nardarya-Watson estimator, can be utilized.
(3.0)
where: n is the number of exemplar observations in the KR model
and Yi are the
observation of the input and output exemplars respectively
is a query input
is a similarity function
In order to facilitate the understanding of the mechanics of the Nardarya-Watson estimator, Garvey
discusses the steps implemented in KR and relates each step to terms of the estimator. As such, the KR
methodology is broken into three steps for a given query of inputs:
1. Calculate the distance of the query from each input exemplars.
2. Convert the distances to weight, similarities, via a kernel function.
3. Determine the output prediction by calculating a weighted average of the output
exemplars.
Before discussing each of these steps, it is necessary to clarify the inputs X and outputs Y, which the KR
model seeks to imitate. These input and output are observations vectors, which form the memory of
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the KR model and are often referred to as exemplars. For purposes of discussion, let the input
observations consist of p input variables and the output observations consist of m output variables.
Therefore, the X input and Y output exemplars make up the memory matrices with dimensions of
and
3.1.1

, respectively.
Step 1 – Distance Calculation
A distance calculation quantifies the proximity of the query to each input exemplar. Although

several distance functions may be used, the Euclidean distance, which is also referred to as the L2-norm,
is the most common. For a single query input, the Euclidean distance for the

exemplar is

given by:
(3.1)
When the query is an

input vector, the Euclidean distance for the

exemplar becomes:
(3.2)

where:

is the
exemplar observation vector of p process variables
is the query observation of the p process variable or measures.

The resulting column vector d contains the distance of the query to all of the input exemplar
observations. As mentioned, there are several alternative distance functions that may be used. One
such alternative is the Adaptive Euclidean distance. This function not only calculates the query distance
but it also excludes those queries that lie outside the minimum and maximum input exemplar
observations. However, a detail discussion of the Adaptive Euclidean distance function is beyond the
scope of this paper, and the interested reader is referred to Garvey and Hines [35].
3.1.2

Step 2 – Similarity Quantification
The

vector of distances is then transformed in to a

vector of weights via a kernel

function in order to quantify the similarity of the query vector to the input exemplar. Although several
kernel functions, such as the inverse distance, exponential, absolute exponential, uniform weighting,
triangular, biquadratic, and tricube kernel [34] are available, the most commonly used and generally an
adequate selection is the Gaussian kernel function. The following equation defines the
corresponding to the

distance of the

weight

distance vector:
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(3.3)
The result of Equation 3.3 is a column vector of n weights that represent the similarity of the
query vector x to each observation vector of the input exemplar. Note that the h term in equation 3.3
refers to the kernel's bandwidth, which can be thought of as a regularization parameter. A more
detailed discussion of this parameter is presented in subsection 3.3.1.
3.1.3

Step 3 – Output Prediction
With the final step, the prediction is the sum of the product of the transposed weight vector and

the output exemplar

divided by the sum of the weight vector. The following equation generalizes this

step:
(3.4)
With each of the KR step described, the similarity function is now mapped to a real number, a
weighting coefficient, based on a Gaussian probability density function and the relative distance
between queries and historical observations. Substitution of terms has transformed the expression on
the right side of equation 3.0 to the generalized weighted-average expression of equation 3.4. The next
task is the implementation of equation 3.4 as the core of several data-driven prediction models.

3.2

Model Initialization

With the general method of mapping a query to weights presented, attention is now turned to the
initialization or format of a specific model. In order to determine the format of a model, it is necessary
to determine the architecture type and required variables as illustrated by Figure 8. The following
discussion focuses on three architectures, which are utilized by this specific kernel regression
methodology, and the optimum selection of predictor and response variables.
3.2.1

Architecture Types
The architectures (inferential, heteroassociative, and autoassociative) are characterized by the

number and type of model inputs and outputs. An inferential model (a) uses a query with p input
parameters to predict single output parameter. A heteroassociative model (b) illustrates the use of a
query with p input parameters to infer m output parameters. Note, however, m may or may not be
equal to p, but must be great than one. Finally, an autoassociative model (c) uses a query with p input
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parameters to predict corrected values of the same query as output values. Garvey [21] describes each
of these architectures using the three step kernel regression process discussed in the previous section.
Those descriptions are summarized in the following paragraphs.
Furthermore, the same conventions and simplifications utilized by Garvey are also used here, and
are as follows:





The query observation is assumed to be within the training range which allows the
application of Euclidean distances as represented by Equations 3.1 and 3.2.
Noting that the weighted sum of the outputs is normalized by the sum of the
weights, Garvey defines the sum of the weights as a scalar via the following:
(3.5)
Using the preceding equation and the definition of weights, Equation 3.5, the
Nardarya-Watson estimator can be written as:
(3.6)

At this point, the three steps of the KR modeling process are applied relative to each of the three
architectures. The first two steps, the distance calculation and the similarity quantification are the same
for each of the architectures; therefore, are presented in reference to all three. The third step however,
is different for each of the architectures and presented individually for each.

Figure 8: Modeling Architectures
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Recall that the first step is the calculation of the distance of query x from each of n exemplar
within the memory matrix. The direct application of Equation 3.2 results in the following column vector
of n distances.

(3.7)

With the distance vector determined, the next step is its transformation into a column vector of n
weights via a kernel function as illustrated by Equation 3.3. As stated, the Gaussian kernel function most
commonly used, but several alternatives are available. The following is the column vector of n weights
is the resulting similarity quantification.
(3.8)

Now that the first two steps of the kernel regression methodology are complete, the third and
final step of the process, the output estimation, is presented. It is important to understand that
although the type and number of expected output parameters is dependent upon the particular
architecture, the form of the Nardarya-Watson estimator is valid for all three architectures.

In

consideration of this, the outputs of each architecture type, respective to its application of Equation 3.6,
are briefly discussed.
3.2.1.1 Inferential Architecture
The inferential architecture uses a

query, where p represents one or more process variables,

to predict a single output value . Although inferential KR models most commonly use independent
input query values to infer a related, dependent output value, they can be used to estimate a specific
input parameter. Nevertheless, this particular architecture produces a single output via the following
application of Equation 3.6:
(3.9)
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3.2.1.2 Heteroassociative Architecture
It follows that if an inferential KR model infers a single output, then it can be adapted to infer
multiple outputs. As already discussed this type of model is referred to as a heteroassociative model,
and is characterized by its use of a query with p inputs to predict m outputs. Like inferential KR, the
outputs of a heteroassociative model may or may not be that of the inputs, but again it is mostly used to
predict related dependent values of the input values. Obviously, only the results of this third step differ
in the modeling process. That is, given a column vector of n weights, the m output predictions for a
heteroassociative KR model are calculated according to the following application of Equation 3.6:
(3.10)
The

term of in the above equation is the

exemplar observation of the of the

exemplar

parameter.
3.2.1.3 Autoassociative Architecture
Finally, an autoassociative KR model is like the heteroassociative model in that it uses a query of
multiple input parameters to estimate multiple outputs parameters.

However, unlike the

heteroassociative model, this particular KR model does not make predictions of related, dependent
variables. An autoassociative model is a correction model. This type of model takes a query of p
parameters in which one or more of these parameters may be faulted and predicts the expected value
of the parameters. In order to achieve this functionality, Equation 3.6 must be modified by replacing the
output exemplars Y with the input exemplars X. Therefore, the input exemplars perform the same
function as that of output exemplars. These corrected output parameter values are determined by the
following version of Equation 3.6:
(3.11)
The

term is the

exemplar observation of the

3.2.2

Variable Selection

exemplar variable.

There are a number of proposed techniques that have been used for the optimal selection of
input variables for an inferential model. Examples of such methods include Ordinary Least Square
Regression and Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator Regression (LASSO). However, due to
the fact that the problem of variable selection is improperly posed, the success of these and other
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proposed techniques is limited.

Practitioners often find that the various techniques can produce

different selection results due to either minor changes within the data or different assumptions that
were used to derive a specific methodology. Therefore, practitioners often use very simple correlation
methods to determined those variables that are statistically related [36].
Correlation analysis is the most simple and straightforward method used for the selection of
predictor variables. In the simplest terms, this analysis identifies those variables having the highest
correlation with corresponding response variables. This analysis usually assigns a value indicating the
strength of the correlation between two variables in the form of a coefficient. These coefficients range
between -1 and 1 which is a measure of how one variable varies with another. The sign of the
coefficient indicates the direction in which the variables are correlated with the other.
With correlation analysis, there exists the possibility of selecting a large number of predictors in
the presence of many highly correlated variables. Depending on the functionality of a specific model,
this tendency of selecting too many predictors can be an advantage or disadvantage. For example, the
function of an autoassociative model is to generate responses that are corrected versions of the
predictors. In this case, the selection of several highly correlated predictors is advantageous. On the
other hand, the selection of several highly correlated predictors for and Inferential or heteroassociative
model can be a disadvantage due to the complexity added to the model. Nevertheless, in either case
the practitioner can control variable selection by using limiting criterion to defining levels of correlation.
However, one of the more notable disadvantages of using correlation analysis is the methods
sensitivity to the presence of outliers and spikes due to random noise within data sets. For example, an
analysis of a data set with two independent random noise variables with similarly timed large noise
spikes could indicate that these two variables could have a correlation coefficient of over 0.9.
Therefore, it is important that the data be inspected and if necessary clean by not only removing outliers
and random noise but also by correcting other common problems such as missing data, drifting data,
stuck data, collinearity, and sampling rates.

3.3

Model Optimization
Previously sections described a three step methodology, which a query in the form of an

observation vector with p variables is inputted into a memory-based kernel regression model in order to
predict the occurrence of an event within a monitored process. Three architectures types along with
the most common and simplest technique for the selection of input variables for which this
29

methodology can be initialized were also presented. With the exception of architecture, the parameters
that most significantly impact a model's performance have only been mentioned in passing and
therefore require more detailed discussion. The parameters that best optimize a memory-based kernel
regression model include the kernel bandwidth and memory vector selection (including selection
method and the number of vectors selected.
3.3.1

Kernel Bandwidth
Recall that the kernel function of Equation 3.3 contains an h term that defines the kernel's

bandwidth. This term is considered as a modeling regularization parameter because it has a significant
effect on the amount of bias and variance associated with the model. One challenge of data model
development is to achieve accurate results with minimum bias and variance. Due to inverse affect that
bandwidth size has on the bias and variance generated by a model, the practitioner must seek a balance
between them while maintaining acceptable accuracy. Therefore, the selection of an appropriate
bandwidth is a key part of non-parametric regression fitting.
In the case of kernel regression, the regularization parameter affects the bias and variance
relationship by controlling which effective distances are deemed similar [21]. An explanation of how
this control is exerted either increasing or decreasing the size of the kernel bandwidth, illustrated by
Figure 9, is best presented by Hines [1, 37].
Consider a Gaussian kernel function with a small bandwidth, Plot A of Figure 9. This kernel
function generates large weights for those input exemplars that are very near to the query observation.
As a result, only a small number of these exemplars significantly influence the model's prediction.
Therefore, information contained within the model's memory matrix with greater distances from the
query is not utilized in its output estimation. This under utilization decreases the model's capabilities to
produce accurate, consistent estimates for those parameters that lie between training states and results
in an overall rough input-output relationship.
Next, consider a Gaussian kernel function with a large bandwidth, Plot B of Figure 9. In this case, the
larger bandwidth is less specific and assigns significant weights to a larger range of distance values.
Therefore, a relatively large number of exemplars would influence the resulting estimation and act to
smooth the input-output relationship. Although a smooth input-output relationship is desirable, the use
of a kernel bandwidth that is too large would cause the model's predictions to approach the mean value
of the exemplar. As a result, the weights become evenly distributed across all the observation instead of
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being concentrated on a single or handful of data. In this situation, the model’s fit is over smoothed,
thus, biasing the solution.
The selection of a kernel bandwidth is a tradeoff between the perceived roughness and
smoothness parameters that balances the variance and bias, Plot C of Figure 8. This concept of biasvariance tradeoff leads naturally to the minimization of a prediction error that combines both of these
model characteristics. A common measure of prediction error is the mean squared error (MSE). The
MSE for a single variable is defined by the following equation [37]:
(3.12)
where:

is the number of test observations
is the model prediction of the ith test observation, and
is the actual value of the ith test observation

MSE is also defined has the sum of a model's variance and bias squared as formulated in the following:
(3.13)
As a result of Equation 3.13, MSE is a useful criterion for the determination of optimal bandwidth, and
thus applied to the work presented herein. MSE, as discussed later, is the most cited performance
metric indicating a model’s accuracy. However, unlike the determination of a model's accuracy, the MSE
in this case is determined by data sampled from the same set as that used for model training.

Figure 9: Effects of Bandwidth Size[38]
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It should be noted that technically, equation 3.12 includes a weighting term in the summation.
However, Härdle [39] concluded that the weight function does not significantly influence the selection
of the proper regularization parameter. Therefore the weighting term is often assumed to have a value
of one.
3.3.2

Vector Selection
Vector selection is critical in the development of an empirical non-parametric model.

As

discussed, step 1 of the kernel regression methodology compares a query with historical observations
called exemplars or memory vectors by quantifying a distance measure between them. Since a query is
compared to each observation within a memory matrix, the computational load for models containing
large training data sets can become a hindrance, especially when dealing with near-real-time health
management systems. In order to lessen the computational burden of large, complex, memory based
models, a subset of observation vectors is chosen from the training set. The following section focuses
on the three methods of selecting sets of exemplars and the considerations that affect the number of
vectors chosen.
3.3.2.1 Selection Methods
There are five traditional vector selection methods (min-max, vector ordering, min-max/vector
ordering combination, fuzzy c-means clustering, and Adeli-Hung clustering) described by Hines and
Garvey [40]. The latter two, fuzzy c-means and Adeli-Hung clustering methods, are relatively new and
have not been integrated into commercial monitoring systems [37]. Given this consideration and for the
reason that the min-max, vector ordering, and min-max/vector ordering combination is computationally
less intensive, only these three methods are discussed for the sake of brevity.
The first of these methods is min-max in which the exemplars are selected via the following
procedure. The data matrix is first broken into a series of bands. Second, two vectors, one containing
the local minimum and the other containing the maximum, are selected from each band.
The number of bands

is determined via the ratio of the number of exemplar specified nm and

divided by twice the number of p variables. The ratio is expressed by the following notation:
(3.14)
The above definition can be rationalized by considering the general case of selecting n vectors
form a training data matrix with p variables. The number of bands that the data set must be broken into
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is a function of the number of exemplars that are to be selected from each band. As the name of this
selection method implies, the minimum and maximum values of each variable are selected from each
band. As a result, 2p vectors, one containing the minimum value and one containing the maximum
value, are selected from each band. Therefore, the number of bands needed to select n vectors is equal
to the ratio previously defined. It should be noted that the min-max vector selection technique
guarantees that the vectors are bound by the training's data's operating range. However, the selected
vectors may not sufficiently cover the intermediate values between the local minimum and maximums.
The next selection method is referred to as vector ordering. This method orders the vectors
according to some criteria and then periodically samples them until the specified number, nm, of
memory vectors is obtained. The criteria for ordering the vectors in this discussion is based on the
Euclidean norm N, which is the square root of the sum squares the ith observations of the p variables.
(3.15)
The vectors are then ordered from smallest to largest of the calculated Euclidean norm. The number of
sequential sampling steps ns is determined by dividing the total number of vectors n by the number of
vectors to be selected nm. The memory vectors are selected by sampling every ns sorted vector. It
should be noted that the Euclidean norm is a distance measure of the ith observation from the origin. As
a result, a vector ordering based on the Euclidean norm is related to the location of the origin and
therefore the data should be mean-centered and scaled to unit-variance before this selection method is
applied.
The third selection method is a combination of the min-max and vector ordering methods. The
previously discussed selection methods are combined in an effort to select vectors that bound the data
operating range (min-max method) and sufficiently span the intermediate values (vector ordering). The
two methods are combined via an algorithm consisting of the following two steps. First, vectors are
selected according to the min-max vector selection and removed from the data matrix. Then, the
remaining vectors are selected using vector ordering. To summarize, 2p vectors are selected via minmax selection with the remaining vectors

selected by using the vector ordering method.

3.3.2.2 Number of Memory Vectors
The number of exemplars selected to be used in an empirical model controls the number of
operating points that represents the monitored system. Similarity based modeling techniques utilize a
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query's similarity to historical observations to infer the model's response. It can be seen that the
comparison of a query vector to large data set becomes not only cumbersome, but computational
expensive. As vector selection is an important consideration for model development, the identification
of the appropriate number of memory vectors should also be carefully considered. Too few memory
vectors will give a fast run time, but poor overall model performance. On the other hand, too many
memory vectors results in improve model performance, but at slower computational speeds. Just as
modeling is the result of compromises between model performance and model complexity, the number
of memory vector is a compromise between performance and run time. This balance is based on the
specific needs of the modeling system.
As with other characteristic optimization, the goal of optimizing the number of exemplars is to
minimize model accuracy or uncertainty while an acceptable operational coverage.

Both of these

objectives are balanced with minimizing model run time.

3.4

Model Performance Evaluation
Recall that a supervised system must be able to detect, evaluate, and diagnose the occurrence of

faults. At the center of a supervised system, is a predictive model that emulates a monitored system's
operation during normal conditions.

Therefore, the performance of a predictive model used for

purposes of system monitoring must be evaluated and quantified within the context of the following
three questions:
1. How well does the model predict sensor or process parameter values?
2. How does the model respond to faulted inputs values?
3. How much degradation within a sensed signal or monitored system must occur
before the model is able to detect it?
The following section presents five performance metrics that answers the above questions by
quantifying the accuracy, sensitive, and detectability for a given model. It should be noted that these
particular metrics are traditionally used to evaluate the performance of an autoassociative model.
Hence the models presented herein is based on heteroassociative architecture, the discussed metrics,
with the exception of accuracy, are not directly applicable. Nevertheless, a brief review of each metric
has been included for completeness.
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3.4.1

Accuracy
The first of these metrics quantifies the agreement between the model's estimates and the actual

sensor or parameter values given unfaulted input values. As alluded to earlier, the most commonly
cited accuracy metric is simply the mean square error. However, for the purpose of quantifying a
model's ability to produce predictions both correctly and accurately, this metric should be generated
from data that was either sampled before the training and testing data was sampled, or form a different
data set all together[41]. Although accuracy is a significant indicator of a model's performance, its
ability to monitoring a system for the purpose of fault detection must also be quantified.
3.4.2

Sensitivity
The accuracy of a model quantifies its response to unfaulted input data, but for fault detection

systems, a determination of how a model's response to faulted input must also be made. These metrics
are generally referred to as sensitivity measures; that is, how sensitive is the model to input data from
operations under abnormal conditions. Model sensitivity is simply the change in an output prediction
produced by a change in the input

:
(3.16)

The following discussion presents two sensitivity metrics used to quantify the effect of input data from a
faulty system.
The auto-sensitivity or robustness metric is the model's ability to make correct output predictions
when the corresponding input is incorrect due to some fault. That is, robustness measures how a
faulted variable input affects predictions of itself by quantifying the effect of sensor drift[42]. The
following expression defines the auto-sensitivity for the ith sensed measurement [37, 41, 42]:

(3.17)
Here,

is the unfaulted prediction

is the prediction with a faulted input

is the unfaulted input

is the drifted input and k is the index of the samples that define the operating region. A value of
zero is desirable which means that the model is impervious to the input fault. However, as the metric
approaches a value of one, the more sensitive to input fault and therefore the prediction tend to follow
the fault. In this case, the resulting residual approaches zero leaving fault undetected. When the metric
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is a non-zero value, and then the sensor fault may be underestimate which may require that the fault
tolerance be adjusted.
On the other hand, the cross-sensitivity or spillover metric indicates the effect that faulty input
has on non-corresponding predictions

of the model. It is similar to the auto-sensitivity metric with

the exception that the predicted component, indicated by index j is the unfaulted variable whose crosssensitivity metric is being calculated [37, 41, 42].

(3.18)
3.4.3

Detectability Metrics
The detectability metric quantifies the smallest fault that can be detected by an empirical model.

Two examples of fault detectability metrics is presented herein. They are the Error Uncertainty Limit
Monitoring (EULM) detectability and Sequential Probability Ratio Testing (SPRT) detectability. Both
metrics are positive values indicative of the detectability as a percentage of the mean measurement.
Although EULM or SPRT is not used in the work presented in this paper, a brief review is to follow.
The EULM detectability indicates the smallest sensor fault detectable by an empirical model and is
a function of the prediction uncertainty and the robustness of the model [42]. It can be define by the
following equation with units of percentage:
(3.19)
Here,

is sensor

95% confidence interval

is it's expected or nominal value, and

is the

corresponding auto-sensitivity. Alternatively, the units of the above equation maybe express as percent
of span if the

term were replaced by the span of the

sensor [1, 37, 42, 43]. Note that EULM

detectability increases as model auto-sensitivity increases resulting in the detection of only large faults.
The SPRT detectability parameter, on the other hand, is an anomaly detection performance metric
that determines the smallest detectable faulted process parameter.

The general procedure for

implementing SPRT has already been provided Section 2.1.2.4 under the title Hypothesis Testing via
SPRT and will not be repeated here.
Using this procedure, Hines et al [1, 37, 41] applied SPRT to the generated residuals between an
actual measurement and an empirical model's prediction. The residuals are assumed to be normally
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distributed with a mean of zero and a variance of

, which is the random variation of the

measurement. This assumption allows the probability distribution function for the normal model of the
residuals to be defined by the following:
(3.20)
From Equation 3.20 and the preceding description, the two degradation modes illustrated in
Figure 10 are readily apparent. A mean shift up (+M) is shown in the first plot; whereas the second plot
shows a mean shift down (–M). The random uncertainty is denoted by the spread of the Gaussian
function. The SPRT simply determines it the residual sequence is more probably generated from the
normal or faulted distributions.
The natural logarithms of the likelihood ratios for the upward and downward mean shifts are
given in Table 2. Most implementations of the SPRT algorithm use these ratios are compared to the
lower and upper boundaries defined by A and B, respectively, of Equation 2.9. For the interested
reader, the derivation of the rations in Table 2 can be found in Humenik[44].

Figure 10: Illustration of Degraded Modes for Normal Distribution [41]
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Table 2: Log Likelihood Ratio for Normal Distribution
Degradation Mean M and Variance σ2[41]
Degradation Mode

Log Likelihood Ratio

+M

M
M
x 
2 
 
2 

–M

M
M
x 
2 
 
2 

The size of the change in a sensor due to a fault that can be reliably detected by the SPRT is
defined as the magnitude of M.

An optimal M value is determined numerically by applying SPRT to

unfaulted test data and locating the value that results in a false-alarm probability that is nearest the
theoretical false alarm probability. By estimated the optimal M value

the following detection

performance metric is obtained.
(3.21)
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4

SIMULATION DATA
The data used in this work was provided by Hamilton Sundstrand, an OEM of aerospace products

including electric power generation systems. Several data sets were generated from an in-house
simulation using Simulink© that was seeded with faults emulating a feeder disconnection and/or opencircuit diodes. Two sets were used in this work and are described in the following subsections.
However, since the simulation is proprietary and unavailable, a discussion of it has been omitted.

4.1

Integrated Drive Generator
Due to the wide use of electronic flight instrument systems, modern aircraft rely heavily on

electrical power systems. The function of the aircraft electrical system is to generate, regulate, and
distribute electrical power throughout the aircraft. There are several different power sources that an
aircraft may utilize to provide for its electrical needs. These sources include integrated drive generators
(IDG), auxiliary power units (APU), ground power unit (GPU), and ram air turbines (RATs). The IDG is
driven by an aircraft engine and produces 115 VAC at 400 Hz which is used during normal flight. The
APU is similar to the IDG with the exception that it is not engine driven. The APU most often provides
power to the aircraft while it is on the ground during maintenance or for engine starting. In some
aircraft the APU can be used as a backup power source during flight operation. A GPU is an external AC
power source that may only be used with the aircraft on the ground. The final power sources that can
be found on a modern aircraft are RATs. These units are used as an emergency power source in case of
IDG or APU failure. These power generation systems are vital to the operational safety and readiness of
both commercial and military aircraft.
As previously discussed, modern aircraft, private, commercial, and military, have large electrical
requirements critical to aircraft take-off, flight, and landing systems. To meet these electrical needs
most modern aircraft utilize an IDG.

This device is an ultra-lightweight, brushless wound rotor

synchronous electrical machine design to supply 400Hz, 3-phase power at 115V to the aircraft bus [45].
Kennett's [45] constant speed drive, CSD, description alone with Batzel's and Swanson's [43] description
of an IDG is summarized. A cross-section of a typical Hamilton Sundstrand brushless, synchronous
generator is shown in Figure 10. The schematic of Figure 11 provides a simplified illustration of how an
IDG operates which is described as follows.
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Figure 11: Typical Integrated Drive Generator Cross-Section [46]

Figure 12: Simplified Integrated Drive Generator Schematic [46]
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The IDG consist of three constituent machines (an exciter armature, a rectifier, and a main
armature) assembled on a common shaft and housed in a common frame. The shaft and housing are
connected to the output of a constant speed drive (not shown), CSD, which is attached to the aircraft
engine. As one may discern from the name, the CSD differentiates the rotation speed of the aircraft
engine so that a constant rotation speed is maintain at the IDG. The first generator of the IDG is the
pilot exciter, which is a permanent magnet generator, PMG. The PMG generates a DC current, iexc, which
induces a magnetic field (the exciter field). The strength or magnitude of the exciter field is determined
by the generate DC current, which is automatically adjusted via a generator control unit, GCU.

The

constant speed rotation of the 3-phase exciter armature in this magnetic field induces a 3-phase voltage
whose amplitude is proportional to the field strength. The induced 3-phase voltage is then converted by
the rectifier to a DC current, if, which induces a second magnetic field. This magnetic field is induced
within the main armature which, is a stationary 3-phase armature yielding electrical power flow to the
main AC bus.

4.2

Discrete IDG Data
The first of the two data sets consist of the following four variables.





Time
Exciter Field Current
Main Armature Current, each of three phases
Main Armature Voltage, each of three phases

(seconds)
(amperes)
(amperes)
(volts)

The data is simulated at three static, balanced loads of 5, 40, and 90 kilowatts, and at each load, the
data as a varying degree of either a single fault or combination of faults. The faults are indicative of
varying levels of degradation of either a connection failure of an armature feeder lead (Type A), opencircuit within a diode (Type B), or a combination both. The levels of degradation are as follows:
No Degradation of feeder leads or circuit
Mild Degradation of feeder leads or circuit
Failure of feeder leads or circuit
There are a total of 27 discrete data sets with 4001 observations and seven trackable signals each.
Based on the run time and the number of samples, the calculated sampling frequency is 400025 hertz.
Figure 13 shows the resulting data from the simulations with each subplot illustrating the affect of a
specific fault or combination of fault has on the current at a loading of 5 kilowatts. That is, subplot 11
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Figure 13: Exciter Current at 5 kilowatts
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is representative of normal system behavior; whereas, subplot 33 indicates the effect of both faults on
the exciter current.
Figure 13 also shows an interesting phenomenon that the effect that the severity of specific fault
has on the pattern of the current. When the severity of either the fault due to the feeder connection or
open-circuit diode is significantly high, the patterns become constant. This actually makes sense
considering that the highest severity level of the particular fault would indicate complete failure of a one
of the three feeder connections or one of the six diodes. Also note from the last row of subplots of
Figure 13, the Type A fault supersedes that of the Type B fault. Similar phenomenon can be seen from
Figures A1 and A2, of the exciter current at 40 and 90 kilowatts respectively.
Figures 14 and 15 demonstrate the effects that the power demand and the fault or faults has on
the magnitude of the mean and variance of the current from the exciter field. Note that, as expected,
when the demand for power increases the average exciter current increases as well. However, it
appears that a specific fault or combination of faults has only a small affect, even when the severity of
the fault may indicate a complete failure. This small effect is explained by the presence of the GPU
which regulates the current from the PMG so that the power output of the generator meets demand
even in the presence of the seeded faults. However, there appears to be an effect on variance of the
exciter current, but this effect is only significant when one or both faults indicates complete failure.
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Figure 14: Average Current Relative to Power and Fault Condition
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Figure 15: Current Variance Relative to Power and Fault Condition

Figures 16 and 17, shows the voltage and current measurements from the main armature at 5
kilowatts respectively. As seen, neither of the faults or combination of faults has any affect on the
output of these measurements. Once again this can be attributed to the GPU which masks the affects
that these faults might how on the IDG power output. Therefore, the use of main armature voltage and
current measurements are not indicated as likely trackable signals for these particular faults due to the
corrective action of the GPU. Similar observations are noted in plots of other data sets at the 40 and 90
kilowatt loads, Figures A3 through A6.

4.3

IDG Continuous Data from Simulated Flight
Data generated from two simulations created dynamic profiles of the measurements from the IDG

operation during two 100 second simulated flights. One flight, the f-series, is simulated in which no
faults occur; whereas, the second flight, the g-series, is simulated in which six seeded faults occur at
unknown time instances. Like the previous data, the faults consist of two types, an armature feeder
lead disconnection, and a diode open circuit. However, these faults do not occur at different severity
levels. Each occurring fault conforms to a one-second load sequence. As a result the simulated fault
clears automatically at the end of the one-second period.
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Figure 16: Main Armature Voltage at 5 kilowatt
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Figure 17: Main Armature Current at 5 kilowatt
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The 100 second flights are comprised of 7 different flight segments ranging from 5 to 40 seconds
each, and have a power loading 20 to 60 percent of the 60 kilowatt nominal loading for the entire flight.
For each segment, approximately 75 percent of the loading is resistive (linear) with the remaining being
rectifier (nonlinear) loading. Furthermore, each load type is 75 percent steady loading with the balance
being random over a range of ± 33 percent.
Each 100 second flight consists of 100 one-second periods in which the load condition is held
constant. These one-second periods represents 400 cycles of the main generator AC and 1000 cycles of
the exciter generator AC. It is assumed that the transient dynamics from the load switching occur within
first several cycles of each generator. Therefore, the majority of the one-second period is considered to
be at steady state. The data is sampled at a rate of 60 kilohertz.
As with the previous data sets, this data includes the following measurements:






Time
Exciter Generator Field Current
Exciter Generator Field Voltage
Main Generator Armature Current (3 Phase)
Main Generator Armature Voltage (3 Phase)

Figure 18 illustrate the exciter current and voltage plots of the available measurements profiles
for non-faulted 100-second flight. Figures 19 and 20 are plots of the main generator currents and
voltages of same 100-second flight. As previously stated, the second flight simulation is seeded with six
faults. The faulted flight data is plotted in Figures 21, 22, and 23 in the same manner as the non-faulted
flight. Unlike the discrete data of the former subsection, the faults are not obvious, and provides
opportunity to demonstrate the capability of the innovated method describe in the next section.

47

Un-Faulted Exciter Current
60

Amps

40

20

0

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

70

80

90

100

Un-Faulted Exciter Voltage

Volts

10

5

0

0

10

20

30

40

50
60
time (sec)

Figure 18: Flight Exciter Data from the Non-Faulted Flight
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Figure 19: Main Generator Current Data from the Non-Faulted Flight
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Figure 20: Main Generator Voltage Data from the Non-Faulted Flight
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Figure 21: Exciter Data from the Faulted Flight
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Figure 22: Main Generator Current Data from the Faulted Flight

Faulted Main Generator Armature Voltage Phase A

Volts

500
0
-500

0

20

40

60

80

100

Faulted Main Generator Armature Voltage Phase B

Volts

200
0
-200

0

20

40

60

80

100

Faulted Main Generator Armature Voltage Phase C

Volts

200
0
-200

0

20

40

60

80

100

time

Figure 23: Main Generator Voltage Data from the Faulted Flight
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5

Univariate Monitoring
Traditionally, as explained in Section 2, model-based fault diagnosis systems utilize a variety of

input measurements including operational information and sensed variables to simulate particular
output measurements.

These simulated outputs are compared to the actual outputs, and the

differences are noted in the form of residuals. An analysis of the residues discerns whether the actual
output is either within or has deviated from normal expected behavior. Indication of substantial
deviation connotes the presence of an abnormality within the monitored system resulting in the
engagement of diagnostic functions. At this point, the residues are further evaluated in order to isolate
the system location where the anomaly originated, which may be sufficient enough, depending on
system resolution, for determining abnormally operating (faulty) components.

Highly developed

diagnostic systems, however, go beyond isolation and identify the severity and time of occurrence of
fault event, which can be used estimate the reliability of the component and the overall system health.
As an example, Figure 24 illustrates an AAKR diagnosis scheme. Here, the AAKR model uses
exemplars composed of correlated variables to estimate the non-faulted instances of the tracked
signals. These predicted signals are then subtracted from the actual system values resulting in a
collection of residuals. These generated residuals are in turn evaluated by an anomaly detection
algorithm such as the Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) in order to determine if the residuals are

Figure 24: Traditional AAKA Monitoring via Error Correction
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symptomatic of a fault.

However, this type of monitoring system, as most systems based on

multivariate methods, cannot be applied if significant correlation does not exist between the system
variables. Therefore, an alternative a technique for monitoring a system’s health is required using a
single sensed variable. Unfortunately, such techniques are scarce in the literature with much of the
published research based largely on the monitoring of temporal based statistics as described in Section
2.2.1, or vibrational frequency analysis [47].

Therefore, the coming sections describe an unique

univariate detection and diagnostic algorithm that estimates the specific “correct” frequency features of
a single signal using operational stressors as inputs to a exemplar-based model spanning the normal
operating range of a monitored system.

5.1

SUMM: Stressed-based Univariate Monitoring Method
In the physical world, measurable quantities can be expressed as a signal, and their generation is

usually associated with the response of a system to stimulus or force. Therefore, it is intuitive that the
effect of a stimulus or force that is not normal to a system would manifest itself has an anomaly.
However, a lack of necessary correlation between a specific measurement that has been determined to
be the primary indicator of system health and other sensed measurements provides unique challenges
for the detection of these unexpected stimuli or forces. The presentation of such a system has spurred
the development of an innovative technique for the detection and diagnosis of faults acting on the
system.
Within the frequency domain, the amplitudes of the sine and cosine waves of the decomposed
time domain signal are described. Measured signals often consist of lower frequency components with
large magnitudes that usually determine the nominal values of the signal and higher frequency
components with small amplitudes that contains information on the inner state of a system [12]. As
such, a signal model based on spectral analysis could be applied that attempts to identify frequency
components and pinpoint anomalies resulting from deviations in the corresponding normal signal. This
particular method of fault detection has been applied to vibration measurements related to rotating
machinery or electrical circuits [9, 11].
Unlike those methods that use vibrational spectral comparisons for the detection and diagnosis of
faults, the stressed-based univariate monitoring method, SUMM, utilizes the differences between the
normal and abnormal frequency spectrums of a single sensed measurement relative to a specific range
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within the overall range of the monitored system. An individual fault or combination of faults causes
either an increase or decrease in the amplitude peaks. These differences between the non-faulted and
the faulted features of the frequency spectrum can be used to detect and isolate specific faults. Figure
25 proposes a basic modeling approach to accomplish this.
The residual generation module is the first part of the basic concept used for this modeling
approach. The expected frequency spectrum features are the product of a heteroassociative memorybased kernel regression module with some operational stressor condition as it input. The actual
features are extracted from the frequency spectrum of a single monitored signal. The spectrum may be
derived via a Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) implemented by an algorithm like the Fast Fourier
Transform available with Matlab®. The residuals are then calculated from the expected and actual
features and input to the second part of proposed concept, the fault detection and isolation module
shown in Figure 26.

Figure 25: Proposed SUMM Residual Generator Scheme
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Figure 26: Proposed SUMM Fault Detection/Isolation Scheme

This module takes the resulting system condition residuals from the generation module and
analyzes them to determine if they are symptomatic of any faults. If symptomatic residuals are
detected, they then mapped to a programmed fault using a second HAKR memory-based model. The
output of this second model effectively isolates the fault by determining its location via a fault
hypothesis. Depending on the complexity of the system, the location would be a subsystem or even a
specific component. Furthermore, the purposed concept, given the appropriate data, can not only
isolate specific faults but identify them as well. Recall that one the major goals of the fault identification
is the determination of the severity of the fault. Although the scope of this work mostly addresses the
detection and isolation of a fault, the applicability of the method to fault identification, i.e., fault
severity, is also demonstrated using the discrete data set.

5.2

Model Development
Both the normal spectrum feature prediction and the fault detection-diagnosis models are

initialized with heteroassociative architectures. This type of architecture results in model using multiple
predictors to estimate a corresponding set of responses. It differs from an autoassociative model in that
the number of response values does not necessarily equal the number of predictors and the response
variables are not corrected values of the predictors.
Model development follows the same general concepts as described earlier. Recall that these
include data conditioning, data partitioning, variable selection, vector selection, model initialization,
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model optimization, and, finally, model characterization. Vector selection, model initialization,
optimization, and characterization were discussed in Section 3, Empirical Modeling Approach. Data
conditioning, data partition, and variable selection are briefly discussed here as it pertains more
specifically to the data used in this work and the unique approach for which it is processed.
5.2.1

Data Conditioning
Normally, the first step in the development of a data based model is to condition the data by

removing and/or correcting problems including, but not limited to, noise, outliers, missing data, and
stuck data. This task is usually referred to as data cleaning, and there are several methodologies for
addressing common data conditioning needs. However, the data used in this work was simulated
without any of the above condition problems or noise; therefore, data cleaning is not necessary.
Nevertheless, actual data will of course include some amount of random variation about the true
value. However, validating the insensitivity of similar methods to nominal levels of process and
instrument noise has been successfully performed in other applications [37] which is assumed to extend
to the univariate method introduce in this work.
5.2.2

Data Partitioning
As in any data based model development, the partitioning of the data into training, testing, and

validation subsets are necessary for model initialization, optimization, and characterization. The training
set should cover the entire range of the original data set including the maximum and minimum
observation values. The primary function of the training set is to initialize, and as the descriptive term
indicates, train the model. The testing set should include data points that fall within the range of the
training set, but were not seen by the initial model. This data set is required to accomplish optimization
of model parameters such as optimum bandwidth and number of memory vectors.

Finally, the

validation data is a small fraction, approximately 10 percent, of the original data that is randomly
selected and removed before the training and testing data is partitioned. The purpose of this set of data
is to characterize the model's performance. Like the testing data, the validation data must fall within the
range of the maximum and minimum of the pre-partitioned data.
The three described subsets created from partitioning can be implemented using one of several
methods rather easily for data drawn from the time domain. However, methods of partitioning of data
within the frequency domain are limited, especially when the data itself is limited. For the models
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developed using the provided data, the discrete and periodic properties of the signal allow it to be
partitioned into three separate data sets of equal observations by sampling every first, second, and third
observation respectively. The partitioning of the frequency data with this method decimates the data
whereas the sample rate for each resulting data set is a third of the original rate.
5.2.3

Variable and Input Selection
In the case of the simulated data described in Section 6, the direct current generated by the PMG

has been identified by the OEM as one of the most useful variables for both fault detection and
diagnostics. Therefore, the OEM as in effect selected the principle variable of the model. As previously
noted the GPU compensates for the affects of the simulated faults, which masks the correlation
between the exciter current and resulting output of the IDG.

As a result , there is insufficient

correlation between the exciter current and other raw signals; therefore, the use of multivariate
modeling techniques such as AAKR or multivariate regression are not possible. However, the proposed
method monitors selected frequency characteristics, features, of a single signal that exhibits definitive
responses to changes in operation conditions. As such, an empirical model with heteroassociative
architecture can be used to predict the expected features of the nominal frequency spectrum with
varying operating conditions.
The signal of an identified principle health indicator, like that of the exciter current, is transformed
from the time domain to that of the frequency domain. Fourier transforms are the primary connection
between the time and frequency domain, and the DFT is the primary tool for determining the frequency
content of a signal. The DFT returns a symmetric complex vector where the first and second halves are
mirror images of each other. Therefore, the only meaningful information is contained in the first half.
Features from the frequency spectrums corresponding to various stress condition are extracted in
order to build the memory matrix. These features may be peaks, valleys or ratios thereof, which change
in a significant way with faulted operation. Such features are identified by comparing the nominal
frequency spectrum to those of faulted operation. Useful features are those that generate sufficient
symptomatic residuals with faulted operation. If enough such features can be identified, then the
resulting residuals can be used to develop detection and diagnostic routines which can determine the
presence, type, and possibly the severity programmed faults.
Unlike the selection of input variables for the empirical models describe in Section 3, the inputs of
the proposed method are chosen from indicators of conditions that stress the system being monitored.
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As mentioned, features are selected from the frequency spectrum that correspond to designed stresses
that the system is expected to perform. For an IDG, the obvious input stresses would be the power
demand placed on the generator by the aircraft.

5.2.4 SUMM: Application to Discrete IDG Data
SUMM is first applied to the discrete data described in Section 4 in which the frequency domain of
the exciter current is monitored for the detection and isolation of a fault or faults. Recall that the
simulated faults are the result of a connection failure (Type A), an open-circuit (Type B), or a
combination of both. Also recall that each of these faults was simulated at varying degrees of
degradation or severity. With the availability of degradation data, the development of the three layer
diagnostic system is possible.
However, before applying SUMM to this data set, let's verify that there does indeed lack sufficient
correlation between the exciter current and other available measurements. A simple correlation
analysis verifies this assessment. Table 3 summarizes the results of this analysis for each of the variables
relative to the exciter current. As indicated, the linear dependence between the exciter field current
and the other available variables is nonexistent. Now, let's analyze the data for its appropriateness for
the application of SUMM.

Table 3: Correlation Coefficients for Faulted Data Relative to the Exciter Current

Exciter
Current

Main
Armature
Phase A
Current

Main
Armature
Phase B
Current

Main
Armature
Phase C
Current

Main
Armature
Phase A
Voltage

Main
Armature
Phase B
Voltage

Main
Armature
Phase C
Voltage

1.0000

-0.0000

-0.0001

0.0001

-0.0001

0.0001

0.0001
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Figures 27 through 29 shows that the frequency domain provides an expanded insight to the
effects of a fault or faults on the current generated by the exciter generator. Specifically, these figures
illustrate the dependence between the amplitude and varying severity of specific fault conditions using
the discrete data. Figure 27 illustrates the amplitude changes at varying degrees of a fault resulting
from an open-circuit diode at a power loading of 5000 watts. Figure 28 shows changes in amplitudes
that result from the severity of a lead disconnect on the third leg between the exciter and the rotating
rectifier. As a final example of the dependence of amplitude on the type and severity of the fault, Figure
29 demonstrates the effects when both faults occur simultaneously. The first plot, as in the previous
two figures, shows the frequency spectrum of the non-faulted current. The second and third plot shows
the effect when both an armature lead disconnection and a diode open-circuit faults occur.
As noted earlier, the simulation did not include any noise or other data problems; therefore, data
conditioning is not necessary. The data is partition as described earlier with Figures 30 through 32
presenting examples of the training, testing, and validation sets.
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Figure 27: Amplitude - Fault Dependence of Open-Circuit Diode
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Figure 29: Fault Dependence of Exciter Disconnect and Open-Circuit Diode

59

GSS July Simulation Data 11 at 5 kiloWatts
Training ,Testing and Validation Data Overlay
16
15

Amps

14
13
12
11
10
0

100

200

300

400

500
Observations

600

700

800

900

1000

Training, Testing, and Validation DTF Overlay
Test Data
Training Data
Validation Data

4

Amps

10

2

10

0

10

-2

10

0

1

2

3

4

5
kHz

6

7

8

9

Figure 30: Normal Operation Frequency Spectrum Overlay
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Figure 31: Open-Circuited Diode Operation Frequency Spectrum Overlay
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Figure 32: Rectifier Disconnection Operation Frequency Spectrum Overlay

Construction of the required memory matrix for this problem is based on the selection of the
appropriate frequency characteristics to the specific power demand. In this case the characteristics are
response peaks that demonstrate sufficient change in magnitude with respect to previously describe
faults. The actually selection of peaks for the model is initiated by first developing a template in which
50 peaks where identified that corresponded to frequencies up to 20 kilohertz of the non-faulted exciter
current at 5000 watt power loading. The identified peaks are indicated on the frequency spectrum
plotted in Figure 33. A function that implements the min-max and vector ordering combination method
was used to select the residual exemplars that were included in model developed for this paper. The
function is applied to the transpose of the residual matrix to select a subset of the 50 spectrum peaks.
For the model presented here, the length of vectors was determined to be 15. Table 4 summarizes the
corresponding frequencies of the 15 selected peaks. Figure 33 graphically illustrate the selected
features on the non-faulted spectrum profile of the exciter current at 5 kilowatts. Features of similar
profiles were selected at the 40 and 90 kilowatts power loadings.
The obvious input stressors for this model fall within the design power output range of the IDG.
Recall that IDG output data has been simulated at three distinct power demands (5, 40 and 90
kilowatts). The power output is not measured directly; therefore, it is calculated via the product of the
root mean square of the AC voltage and the root mean square of the AC current outputs from the main
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Figure 33: Identified Peaks

Table 4: Corresponding Frequencies (in Kilohertz) of Selected Residual Vectors
1.07

1.95

3.91

4.40

4.88

5.86

7.03

7.42

7.81

9.77

11.72

15.63

17.58

18.54

19.54

generator to the IDG. The Normal Spectrum Feature Model is initialized using the root mean square
(RMS) power of each phase produced by the main generator as the predictor variable for each of the
three power loads. This results in a

matrix of memory predictor variables. The response variables

are the peaks from the normal-operation spectra that correspond to the frequencies in Table 4, which
results in a

matrix of memory response variables.

As for the Fault Detection and Identification Model, the residual vectors corresponding to the
frequencies of Table 4 are the training exemplars and fault severity indices are the training responses.
Figures 34, 35, and 36 show the selected features of the various faulted spectrum profiles of the exciter
current at 5 kilowatts. Note that these features occur at the same frequency as that of the non-faulted
features. The resulting memory matrix consists of 27 observations and 15 residual vectors. The
response variables is a

matrix of fault indexes, with the first column corresponding to the

rectifier disconnection and the second column corresponding to the open-circuit diode.
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Figure 34: Selected Model Features for Open-Circuit Diode
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Figure 35: Selected Model Features for Exciter Armature Disconnect
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Figure 36: Selected Model Features for Fault Combination

The following plots, Figures 37 and 38, shows the static bandwidths that were used. The optimum
bandwidth for the Normal Spectrum Feature Model is 0.52 as indicated on Figure 36. From Figure 37,
the bandwidth for the Fault Detection and Identification Model is 0.24.
The predictive results for each of the models are presented in Figures 38 and 39. Figure 38
illustrates the predicted selected feature versus the actual selected features for each spectrum of the
three power loads. As seen, it appears that the normal spectrum feature model produces excellent
results. The model resulted in mean square errors of 0.15, 3.50, and 14.89 for each power load inputs of
15, 40 and 90 kilowatts respectively.
Figure 39 illustrates the results of the Fault Detection and Identification Model. Each of the subplots represents the fault severity for of the two indicated faults at each of the three power loads. The
model gives good predictive results overall, with only one misclassification and two 'near misses' in the
27 example cases studied.

5.2.5 SUMM: Application to Continuous IDG Data
Recall from simulated flight data describe in Section 4.3 that the power load on the main armature
remains constant for periods of one second intervals. The 60,000 observations collected during that
second are used to calculate the frequency spectrum during that period of constant power demand. As
a result, the 6 million time-domain observations are reduced to 100 joint time-frequency domain
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Figure 37: Optimum Bandwidth for Normal Spectrum Feature Model
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Actual(+) vs Prediction(O)
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Figure 40: Fault Detection and Identification Model Results
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observations. Figure 41 shows the frequency spectra for normal and faulted operating conditions. The
top plot shows the spectrum of the normal operating condition, the second plot shows the spectrum of
the Type A fault, and the bottom plot shows the spectrum of the Type B fault. Comparison of these
plots, unlike that of the discrete simulation data, shows that additional peaks appear in the frequency
spectrum due to the introduction of faults. Similar results are seen at each of the load conditions
simulated.
As indicated on the plots, six peaks are chosen to detect and identify faulted conditions.
Because the location of the peaks of interest can shift slightly due to changes in sampling frequency and
amount of available data available; frequency ranges are identified about peaks of interest as indicated
on the plots. The peaks with the greatest magnitude within each range are the ones extracted for
system health monitoring. This differs from the work done on the discrete data and makes the method
more robust to real world data collection. Another difference from the work completed on the discrete
data is that the Identification of useful frequency peaks and appropriate ranges about those peaks is
accomplished by visual inspection.

Figure 41: Frequency Spectra of Exciter Current for Normal and Faulted Operation
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The chosen peaks of the frequency spectrum are used to generate residual patterns between the
expected normal operation and the actual operation. Figure 42 shows the results for each type of
operation: normal, Type A fault, and Type B fault.

The main plot shows the exciter current

measurement for a 14-second interval during the total flight. The secondary plots summarize the
monitoring system execution in three subplots: the exciter current reading during a small portion of the
one second interval in the top subplot, the frequency spectrum during that interval in the second
subplot, and finally the residuals between the calculated frequency spectrum peaks and the expected
peaks based on the load. The leftmost plot gives the results for Type A fault, the middle plot for normal
operation, and the rightmost plot for Type B fault. It is clear from the residual patterns of the two fault
types that they should be easily distinguishable.
After residuals between the normal and actual operating spectra are obtained from the six peaks
of interest, they are run through fault detection routine to determine if the system is operating in a
normal or faulted mode. In this data simulation, faults are simulated to occur for one second and then
are corrected. Because of this simulation method, a simple signal threshold may be used to identify
faulted operation. For the peak ranges of interest, normal operation spectra residuals are below 10
amps while faulted residuals are above 60 – 100 amps, depending on the peak.

Figure 42: Monitoring Model Results for Nominal and Faulted Operation
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However, in real-world applications, the faults would more than likely begin at some small severity
level and progress to greater severity eventually resulting in a failure. In addition, the noise which
would be present in real-world data may muddle the ability to apply a simple signal thresholding
technique. For data of this more realistic type, an SPRT fault detection routine will likely be more useful
to detect incipient faults before they become large enough to cross the threshold values. In the current
study, six one-second intervals in the 100-second simulation are correctly identified as operating in a
faulted condition, while the remaining 94 seconds are correctly identified as normal operation.
The six observations of frequency features which have been identified as faulted operation are
input to a fault identification module to determine if the system is experiencing Type A or B fault. The
fault identification module uses an inferential kernel regression function which compares the residual
values of the six feature peaks to those seen in the past and determines if the current observation is
more likely fault A or fault B. As noted above, the residual patterns for the two fault types are clearly
distinguishable. Because only six faulty observations are available (three of Type A and three Type B), a
leave-one-out validation method is used to test the diagnostic model. That is, an inferential model is
built using five faulted observations and tested on the remaining one; this is repeated for each of the
faulted observations. The diagnostic model gives 100% accuracy in differentiating between Type A and
Type B faults for the six available observations.
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6

CONCLUSIONS
This report presents an innovated method that extends the use of frequency characteristics to the

detection, diagnosis, and identification of system anomalies due to faulty operation of specific system
components.

A novel method for detecting and diagnosing of system faults by monitoring a single

variable using extracted features from the frequency domain has been introduced as SUMM, Stressor
Univariate Monitoring Method. In an effort to demonstrate the capability of this method, two case
studies have been presented whereas the technique has been applied to simulated, noise free data
indicative of an integrated drive generator used by modern aircraft.
The first case study utilized a set of discrete data in which three modes of operation, ranging from
normal to failure, were simulated. Using this data, a three-layer detection and diagnostic system that
model selected frequency characteristics of normal operation. These predicted features provided the
basis for a residual generator which was implemented by a heteroassociative kernel regression model.
The resulting symptomatic residuals are analyzed for indications of abnormal behavior due to the
presence of component damage or failure. The application of SUMM to this data produced promising
results with 26 of 27 faults were detected and diagnosed.
The second case study utilized data from the OEM simulation of actual flight. Once again the
frequency characteristics of the exciter current are used for the development of a fault detection and
diagnosis system using SUMM. Although the data is limited, this technique successfully detected and
isolated all six of the buried faults in the faulted simulated flight. It should be noted that the OEM did
not initially reveal when or where the faults here simulated.
In conclusion, using discrete simulated data, the development of an AAKR model using the available
raw measurements proved to be inappropriate due to the lack of correlation. The proposed method has
been shown to accurately detect abnormal operating conditions due to faulty components with a
system. As demonstrated, the monitoring of the frequency spectrum of a single variable can provide
adequate indication of equipment health. With the availability of the appropriate data, as that of the
discrete data set, it is possible for the development of three-layer detection and diagnostic systems that
provides fault detection, isolation, and identification. A three-layer detection and diagnostic system is
essential in the development of more advance health monitoring and prognostic systems. With this in
mind, a monitoring technique such as SUMM allows for the possible adaption.

Despite some
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shortcomings in the simulated data available for analysis, this method is believed to be applicable to
data that more realistically captures real-world relationships, including sensor noise, faults that grow
with time, and unbalanced loads on the main armature. Several areas of proposed future research are
outlined in the following section.
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7

FUTURE WORK
The preceding report introduced a novel technique for monitoring a system using the frequency

domain of a single variable in conjunction with process stressor. Although the results demonstrated
potential for this method, the reader is reminded that the concept is well within the earlier stage of
development and there is significant opportunity for future work. The following suggestions are a few
areas of interest that will be beneficial not only further defining the limits of this technique, but
expandingits limits as well.
One area in need of more development is the selection of those frequency spectrum
characteristics that indicates deviation from normality. Although specific peaks were selected for the
work presented in the report, other characteristics or combination of characteristics may be utilized.
This work may also include the development of a general algorithm that analyze the frequency spectrum
of a single signal and selects the appropriate number of peaks or other characteristic.
The case studies that this report is based uses simulated data. Obviously, the effectiveness of
SUMM would be better understood if applied to real data. With this in mind, the model should be
expanded to include a wider area of operating conditions such as load imbalances, power fluctuations,
and additional fault possibilities.
A last suggestion would bring SUMM full circle by incorporating it into a PHM system as described
early in the report. The incorporation of a Prognostic module, as illustrated in Figure 43, would allow for
the determination of remaining useful life of equipment and overall system health.
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Figure A1: Exciter Current at 40 kilowatts
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Figure A2: Exciter Current at 90 kilowatts
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Figure A3: Main Armature Voltage at 40 kilowatts
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Figure A4: Main Armature Current at 40 kilowatts
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Figure A5: Main Armature Voltage at 90 kilowatts
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Figure A6: Main Armature Current at 90 kilowatts
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